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Abstract
This paper reviews a sample of studies on the long-term impact of Brexit on GDP and welfare for
both the UK and EU economies. It considers only official and academic studies published before the
end of November 2018. The paper highlights the very wide range of results, especially for the UK,
reflecting great uncertainty. The negative economic impact is more limited for the EU27 and for
most Member States. Small open economies closely related to the UK are more hit than others.
This is the case for Ireland due to geographical proximity, for Luxembourg with its economy
specialising in financial services and for Cyprus and Malta as they are Commonwealth countries.
When only the trade channel of Brexit is estimated, GDP (or welfare) losses are around
1 percentage point of GDP in the Netherlands and in Belgium while these average 0.6 percentage
point of GDP in the EU27. For a same Brexit scenario, the results depend on the model
specifications, on the channels considered and on some key assumptions. For the UK higher
GDP/welfare losses are found for reduced-form approaches, when a productivity shock is added
and, also for the EU, for global value chain approaches. Higher GDP/welfare losses are also
associated with higher non-tariff trade barriers. Results are sensitive to some parameters such as
the reaction of trade volumes to changes in tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers (trade elasticities).
Reaching a Free Trade Agreement could limit the GDP/welfare losses both for the UK and the EU
Member States compared to an orderly no deal (WTO scenario). If the UK remains in the Single
Market or the Customs Union, the GDP/welfare losses induced by Brexit could be even more
contained. This justifies the economic interest for both the UK and the EU Member States to reach
an agreement on their future relationship.
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1. Introduction
On 23 June 2016, UK citizens voted in a referendum to leave the EU. Before and after the referendum,
many studies have tried to quantify the economic impact of Brexit, at first for the UK and then for the
remaining EU27 countries.
In November 2018, a deal was concluded between the UK Government and the European Commission
(EC) on both a Withdrawal Agreement and a Political Declaration on the future relationship between the
EU and the UK. This has led to new analysis estimating the economic impact of the agreement. In order
to become legally binding, the agreement endorsed by the EU Council on 25 November needs to be
ratified by the House of Commons (and the European Parliament). The non-binding nature of the
Political Declaration and its wording in general terms still leave many options open for the future
relationship. Against this background, an overview should still encompass various Brexit scenarios.
The aim of this paper is to inform on the potential long-term economic consequences of different Brexit
scenarios on both the UK and the EU27. How big could the losses be in the event of a hard Brexit? To
what extent can the losses be contained according to the type of agreement reached? To provide
meaningful answers to these questions, the paper gives an overview of the main findings from empirical
research published before 30 November 2018, including those that have been made public in London
in the week following the endorsement of the deal by the EU Council.
The main Brexit transmission channel in the long term is trade in goods and services. After it leaves the
EU, trade between the UK and the EU27 will again face barriers that had been dismantled thanks to the
EU’s Single Market and Customs Union. Therefore, this survey will cover empirical research which
considers at least trade as a transmission channel. But trade is not the only channel towards unwinding
of some of the gains of past economic integration. Our survey includes other transmission channels
such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration, among others.  Financial services are in general
considered as a service that can be traded and financial institutions are companies that can be relocated
but both the specific situation of the City of London and the financial stability issues are generally not
covered. As our focus is on the long term, potential short-term disruptive effects from a disorderly Brexit
have not been taken into account1.
A sample of findings under various institutional scenarios for the future relationship between the EU and
the UK post-Brexit will be compared. The loosest relationship between the two would result from an
orderly no deal. Under such a hard Brexit scenario, trade relations would follow the rules of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). At the other extreme, the closest relationship would be for the UK to remain
a Member State of the EU. Intermediate scenarios include free trade agreements (FTA) like that
implemented recently between the EU and the Canada (CETA), a customs union similar to that between
the EU and Turkey or UK membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) like Norway. The EEA
1  In late November, the Bank of England (2018) examined the short- to medium-term impact of a disorderly Brexit.
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scenario is an example of a soft Brexit offering a closer relationship between the UK and the EU27.
Such a closer relationship comes at the cost for the UK of more limited autonomy.
Our survey focuses on published studies reporting results for most EU Member States while some Brexit
studies covering only the UK economy are also discussed. We have also chosen to restrict our analysis
to estimates from academics and from national or international institutions. Our survey will cover both
large macroeconomic models that are wide in scope but often limited in their modelling of trade flows as
well as more sophisticated trade models developed with narrower scope. Our focus will be on the results
for the whole economy, in particular on GDP or welfare2.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we discuss the main channels through which Brexit can
impact the UK and the EU27 economies. In section 3, we recall the main options (institutional scenarios
for Brexit) from remaining in the EU to an orderly exit without a deal (WTO scenario). Section 4 is
devoted to the impact of a WTO scenario for the UK and for the EU27 treated as a bloc. For the same
scenario, section 5 considers the estimated impact of the trade channel on Belgium as an example of a
small economy having strong trade relations with the UK, while section 6 ranks the EU countries
according to the size of estimated Brexit losses. Section 7 illustrates to what extent various agreements
(including first estimates of the deal reached in November) may mitigate these Brexit losses both for the
UK and the EU countries. Section 8 concludes.
2. What impact could a hard Brexit have on the UK and the EU27 economies?
Economically speaking, a hard Brexit (such as in a WTO scenario) is a shock that affects both the UK
and the EU27 economies through various channels3: trade in goods and services (including financial
services), foreign direct investment, migration, the exchange rate, uncertainty and the EU budget. Brexit
is expected to induce losses to both the UK and the EU 27. The losses for the UK may even be amplified
if the above-mentioned channels also affect productivity, i.e. if they are accompanied by negative
productivity shocks. On the contrary, the UK Government (or subnational authorities) may consider
different kinds of (macro and micro) policies to try to mitigate the GDP losses induced by Brexit.
2  Welfare is often defined as consumption (or income) per capita.
3  For a presentation on how Brexit might affect the UK economy, see Tetlow and Stojanovic (2018). Most of these
channels also play a role in soft Brexit scenarios.
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Table 1 - Channels for the transmission of a hard Brexit to the UK and EU27 economies
For the EU 27 countries
Fo
rt
he
UK
Positive or neutral Negative
Positive or neutral EU budgetUK deregulation
Negative
FDI
Migration
Productivity shock
Trade
Uncertainty
In a hard Brexit, some channels will have a negative impact on both the UK and the EU27 compared to
the current EU membership option. Both areas will lose out from reduced trade as their bilateral trade
will face the WTO’s most favoured nation (MFN4) tariffs on goods and non-tariff barriers on both goods
and services. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) can take many forms, including rules of origin5, customs
handling costs, differences in regulation, restrictions on foreign entry, requirements on qualifications,
standards, licences, nationality requirements or barriers on ownership of companies, barriers on
movement of professionals, etc. Bilateral trade between the UK and the EU27 is particularly important
for the UK as the EU27 is a partner covering around half its trade while the UK barely takes in one-tenth
of EU exports6. Higher trade costs may result in higher prices and/or lower exchanged volumes (trade
4  “For WTO member countries such as the UK, the maximum tariff that can be imposed on the import of a
particular good from any other WTO member country is what is (slightly misleadingly) known as the MFN tariff.
This is the tariff that applies to any country with which the member state does not have a preferential trade
agreement. It is set out in a schedule approved by the other WTO members” (Tetlow and Stojanovic, 2018).
5  “Rules of origin require firms exporting to the EU from outside it to prove which country the product originated
from in order to certify the domestic content of exports” (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2018). These are
administrative compliance costs, in addition to the tariffs, that UK goods would face when these are delivered
to EU markets if the UK leaves the EU Customs Union. “After Brexit, if the UK sets up a FTA with the EU27, UK
firms may be required to prove the origin of exports into the EU – generally where over 50 per cent of the value
of the product was added – to determine whether it can receive potential preferential tariff treatment” (possibly
duty-free treatment) (OBR, 2018, idem). “For products that have components produced or compiled in different
countries, proving origin can be a costly process, to the extent that some firms choose to pay tariffs rather than
meet the rules of origin requirement” (OBR, 2018, ibidem).
6 In 2017, about 44 % of goods and services exports went to other countries in the EU, while 53 % of UK imports
came from other countries in the EU, according to data from the Office for National Statistics (Fullfact, 2018b).
Only 8 % of the EU’s goods and services exports went to the UK in 2016 when intra-EU exports are also
considered (EU data).
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destruction). As a result of higher bilateral trade costs, businesses in the UK and the EU27 might also
divert their activities to new suppliers and customers (trade diversion).
In a hard Brexit scenario, the UK will no longer benefit from existing EU FTAs with third parties like
Canada (CETA, etc.). On the other hand, if the UK leaves the Customs Union with the EU, it is entirely
free to define its own trade policy, concluding for example FTAs with the same or other countries.
However, outside the EU, the UK may become a less attractive FTA partner for third countries, like the
United States, since its market is smaller.
Another channel by which Brexit may entail losses for both the UK and the EU27 is uncertainty. Since
the Brexit referendum, uncertainties have already led to delays or cuts in business investment in the
UK. Businesses still don’t know what Brexit will look like (a hard or a soft Brexit, the existence and the
length of a transition period, etc.) and what it will imply for them exactly. These uncertainties are
expected to dissipate when clarity is made on future trade relations between the UK and the EU27.
Being short-term in nature, the uncertainty channel will only receive scarce7 consideration in this paper
focusing on the long-term impact of Brexit.
Uncertainty may also be reflected in financial markets (risk premiums on UK financial instruments such
as equities or bonds) and in the exchange rate. The most immediate reaction after the Brexit
referendum was a significant depreciation of the pound sterling (GBP). This is expected to help UK
exports by making them less expensive and thus more competitive, but at the same time, sterling
depreciation pushes up the cost of imports for British customers. This has been passed on to a higher
consumer price index, weighing on the purchasing power of households and their consumption and
investment expenditure. Therefore, any depreciation of the pound may lead to an ambiguous net impact
on GDP, both for the UK and the EU27. In the Brexit literature, exchange rate movements have rarely
been considered and when they have, it has mostly been in macroeconomic models where sterling’s
depreciation may be added as a shock or it may be an endogenous change resulting from shocks
applied to other variables (trade tariffs, etc.).
Other shocks may benefit one area at the expense of another. In general, empirical studies8 tend to
show that EU membership has boosted FDI inflows and that Brexit may affect FDI flows to the UK
economy negatively but to the EU27 economy positively. Indeed, the negative impact of firms relocating
their plants from the UK to any EU27 country is found to exceed the positive impact of firms prompted
to establish new units in the UK to circumvent trade barriers and continue to serve the UK market.
7  Some long-term impact estimates, notably from the UK Treasury (2016), assume that the persistence of Brexit-
related uncertainties may induce a loss of around 1 percentage point of GDP.
8  See notably Dhingra et al. (2016b) and de Almeida et al. (2019).
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Since the EU referendum, net migration of EU citizens into the UK has risen much less rapidly than in
the period before the referendum. We may therefore expect this trend to continue in a hard Brexit
scenario.
By leaving the EU, besides the divorce bill issue9, the UK Government will save part or all its net
contribution to the EU budget, the savings being all the more important the shallower relationship
negotiated with the EU.
By further deregulating, the UK may boost its corporate competitiveness with a positive impact on its
economy at the expense of the EU. However, the UK will no longer be able to influence EU regulation
that prevails in its main export market and, furthermore, if the EU authorities move towards more
integration, deepening the Single Market for instance, the UK will likely not benefit from these future
integration gains if it leaves.
Due to the working of all the channels described above, Brexit is expected to lead to GDP losses. This
does not necessarily mean that real GDP will decline at any moment in time. It does mean that real GDP
will reach a lower level under Brexit than if the UK remains in the EU.
Figure 1 - Illustration of long–term static loss from Brexit on the level of GDP
Source: Felbermayr et al. (2017a).
9  The UK will have to pay to the EU for commitments made during its membership. These payments will take
place at the same time as if it were still a Member State.
5
Most channels are reported to have a temporary impact on the growth rate of GDP and thus a permanent
long-term impact only on the level of GDP, while others may eventually also modify the growth rate of
GDP permanently through effects on productivity growth. The first case refers to static gains/losses from
trade, while the second refers to dynamic gains/losses from trade. Since the latter effects are difficult to
quantify, most studies in the empirical literature are static in the sense that at the time of the shock,
economic variables such as GDP start to deviate from their level under a baseline scenario, then, this
deviation from the baseline further increases over time and finally stabilises when the economy has
reached a new equilibrium (figure 1).
3. What are the options for the future relationship between the UK and the EU27?
The (long-term) impact of Brexit on the GDP will differ according to the type of Brexit scenario that will
emerge. With a hard Brexit whereby future EU-UK trade will be more constrained by new barriers, trade
will be more negatively affected than with a soft Brexit scenario where this future relationship involves
less trade barriers. But on the other hand, after a transition period, the UK will no longer pay contribution
to the EU budget in a hard Brexit scenario, while it is expected to still pay some contribution to the EU
budget in a soft Brexit scenario.
There are thus significant trade-offs between conflicting objectives in the discussions on the future
economic relationship. Another crucial trade-off in the negotiations between the EU and the UK has
involved the degree of policy autonomy (for the UK) and the extent of access to the EU’s Single Market.
This has been clearly illustrated by Michel Barnier, EU Commissioner and Chief Negotiator, when he
commented in December 2017 on the type of alternatives10 to EU membership that could be reached
for the UK depending on the UK Government’s red lines at that time11. Starting out from the UK being
part of the EU, he shows how the UK Government’s red lines in the negotiations may lead to a CETA-
like FTA offering very restricted access to the EU Market12.
These kinds of FTA would however still represent less barriers to trade than a hard Brexit based merely
on World Trade Organisation rules or than a disorderly no deal. In a WTO scenario, tariffs are raised to
the MFN terms and NTBs can be substantial. Both drastically limit the access to the EU market, but the
UK would enjoy a free trade policy and a maximal freedom to set other policies, including migration
policy.
10  A full description of these alternatives can be found notably in Fossum and Graver (2017), Geeroms and
Minnaert (2018), Hantzsche et al. (2018a), Morphet (2017), Szyszczak (2017), UK Treasury (2016) and NBB
(2016).
11  Defined notably by UK Prime Minister Theresa May (2017) in a speech in January 2017. Since then, red lines
have moved from both the UK and the EU sides which has allowed the November 2018 agreement.
12 This review of the existing alternative relationships to full membership of the EU should not be seen as
bargaining tactics. The aim of the exercise is purely pedagogical.
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Figure 2 - Possible institutional scenarios according to the original UK Government red lines
Source: Barnier (2017).
In line with the results of the referendum, the UK Government has opted to leave the EU and its
institutions. The existing13 model offering the closest relationship between the EU and another country
is the European Economic Area (EEA), to which Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein belong. In
exchange for full and dynamic access to the Single Market including the EU passport for financial
services, Norway accepts free movement of people with the EU. It hardly enjoys regulatory autonomy;
it has no influence on the EU legislation process and it is submitted to the EU Court of Justice. By being
out of the Customs Union, it faces some customs costs and no access to the trade agreements
concluded by the EU with third countries. Norway benefits from zero tariffs for its trade with the EU
except for agriculture and fisheries. Its Government also pays a very substantial annual contribution to
the EU budget.
If the UK rejects the Norway model, the model offering the next widest access to the EU market is the
current situation of Switzerland, which has concluded a set of bilateral agreements in various sectors
(mostly industrial goods and certain services such as non-life insurance). For these sectors, Swiss firms
enjoy access to the EU market (and vice versa) but the Swiss authorities are required to adopt EU
legislation and pay into the EU budget, albeit at a lower rate than Norway. In return, Switzerland must
accept free movement of EU citizens. Access to the EU market is much more restricted than under the
13  Membership of the EEA plus a customs union with the EU27 (“Norway Plus” option) would be even closer to
EU membership but such a model has not yet existed so far.
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Norway model, especially for services. The financial sector, in particular, has no EU passport (as is the
case for the next alternative models) and relies on less comprehensive and less stable equivalence
regimes.
If the UK does not want to pay a substantial contribution to the EU budget, another alternative model
would be a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), like the one that entered into
force between the EU and Ukraine in September 2017 as part of a broader Association Agreement. It
aims to integrate Ukraine as far as possible into the EU market. It opens the markets via the gradual
removal of almost all tariffs (in trade value) for both agricultural and industrial products and “extensive
harmonisation of laws, norms, regulations in various trade-related sectors, creating the conditions for
aligning key sectors of the Ukrainian economy to EU standards” (EC, 2013). Most aspects of the Single
Market are covered14, but the free movement of people takes the form of a visa-free regime for short-
stay travel.
If the UK wants even more (regulatory) autonomy, it may aim for a customs union, like Turkey has had
with the EU since 31 December 1995 (with a view to Turkey joining the EU in the future). This has
removed tariffs, most customs costs and other NTBs for most manufacturing goods (including related
processed agricultural goods) but all frictions (checks at the border, etc.) have not been removed and
Turkish firms must adopt EU product standards and respect EU competition rules, etc. Services,
agricultural products, investment and public procurement fall outside the scope of the customs union.
There is no free movement of people. Turkey does not enjoy independent trade policies15.
The models considered so far (Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine and Turkey) were established to define
economic relationships between the EU and neighbour countries. This relates to “near” trade
(Szyszczak, 2017). In all these cases, the trade benefits for non-EU member countries are substantial
but one of the main interests for the EU lies in extending EU regulatory norms (standards for
products, etc.) to a wider geographical area. If the UK wants to have wide autonomy both in regulatory
and trade policies, then the solution is a FTA. It is used with countries further afield (“far” trade as in
Szyszczak, 2017). In these FTAs, the EU is less able to dominate the agenda and regulatory cooperative
arrangements tend to refer to international technical standards.
14  “The DCFTA is complemented by a process of legislative approximation in financial services,
telecommunications services, postal and courier services, and international maritime services. The Ukraine is
committed to take over the existing and future EU-acquis in those sectors and, when it has done so, Ukrainian
firms will be granted access to the EU internal market for the sectors concerned. The approximation process
will also mean that EU investors in those sectors will find the same regulatory environment in Ukraine as in the
EU.” (EC, 2013, idem)
15  Turkey is subject to the EU’s trade policy and common external tariffs on imports of goods covered by the
Customs Union. It is also bound to apply to third countries the same preferential treatment the EU has negotiated
with many third countries by means of FTAs. However, Turkish exporters do not automatically benefit of the
same tariff as EU exporters when they trade with these countries with which the EU has concluded a FTA.
Turkey is only free to sign FTAs with third countries in sectors not covered by EU FTAs, provided these sectors
are themselves also not covered by the Customs Union with the EU (Barnard and Leinarte, 2018).
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The FTAs that the EU has reached with Canada (CETA), South Korea and, more recently, with Japan
(JEFTA), are modern as they offer wider market access and cover more items than old-generation FTAs.
But their depth is limited. For example, CETA has removed most tariffs, but there are still some on
agricultural goods and, even on manufactured goods, some tariffs remain for a transitional period;
customs costs apply. As for the other alternatives, CETA does not offer advantages in terms of market
access to countries with which the EU has already concluded FTAs. Services are liberalised but only
partially and with many restrictions. As market entry is limited, Canada is free to set its own rules on
migration and it has more regulatory autonomy. As for financial services, CETA includes a prudential
carve-out, confirming each party’s ability to impose prudential measures if deemed necessary.
Other considerations have also played a major role in the Brexit negotiations. The most significant one
has been the need to avoid a hard border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, not
least to ensure that the island remains an open and peaceful territory, in keeping with the 1998 Good
Friday Agreement, and to maintain the Common Travel Area. Avoiding a hard border requires at least
a customs union and some regulatory alignment. In other words, an EEA scenario, an FTA or a WTO/no-
deal scenario cannot meet the EU and Irish demands and the UK Government’s commitment to ensuring
no hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland (UK Government, 2018b).
The November 2018 Withdrawal Agreement, intended to be legally binding, first of all, provides for a
transition period until the end of 2020 that may be extended by two years to the end of 2022. During
this time, the UK would continue to be part of the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union. Then, unless
and until a trade agreement is reached, a backstop, described in the Protocol on Northern Ireland as
part of the Withdrawal Agreement, would come into effect. In practice, this means that there would be a
single customs territory16 between the UK and the EU27 avoiding the need for tariffs, quotas or checks
on rules of origin, while Northern Ireland would keep full access to the EU Single Market under conditions
of regulatory alignment. Level-playing-field measures have also been agreed on taxation, environment
and labour and social protection standards and EU state aid rules will continue to be enforced directly
as part of the backstop solution.
For the future economic relationship between the EU and the UK, the non-binding Political
Declaration (page 1) “establishes the parameters of an ambitious, broad, deep and flexible partnership
across trade and economic cooperation”. For future trade in goods, the plan is to establish a “free trade
area, combining deep regulatory and customs cooperation” (Political Declaration, p. 6). On financial
services, “The Parties are committed to preserving financial stability, market integrity, investor and
consumer protection and fair competition, while respecting the Parties’ regulatory and decision-making
autonomy, and their ability to take equivalence decisions in their own interests” (Political Declaration,
p. 8). As far as other services are concerned, trade liberalisation well beyond WTO commitments is
16 The scope of this customs union is wider than that between the EU and Turkey as it covers all goods (except
fishery and aquaculture products).
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envisaged, with substantial sectoral coverage. In order to maintain fair competition, the Declaration also
contains level-playing-field measures.
Negotiations on the future relationship will only start after Brexit. The nature of this relationship might
evolve over time both during these negotiations and once the new regime is in place. For an assessment
of the long-term impact of Brexit, it is therefore still useful to investigate the economic consequences of
various Brexit institutional scenarios.
4. How big is the economic impact of a WTO scenario for the UK and the EU27/euro area as a
whole?
Conventions
Throughout this paper, we will use negative signs for losses in the tables and figures but positive signs
for losses and contributions to losses in the text. When factors help reduce losses, they will be mentioned
in the text with a negative sign. Moreover, we will quote the Brexit impact studies by the name of the
institution rather than by the author. The table of correspondence is as follows (in the order of table1):
LSE (2017) = Dhingra et al. (2017) where LSE = London School of Economics (UK)
LSE (2018) = Levell et al. (2018). This study is a collaboration between experts at the Centre for Economic
Performance at the LSE, King’s College London and the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The report is published
by the academic think tank The UK in a Changing Europe.
IMF (2018b) is a Selected Issue of the Article IV Consultation Report on the euro area in July
CAE (2018) = Vicard (2018) where Conseil d’analyse économique (France). The estimation has been realised at
the Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations internationales (CEPII). This research follows that from
Mayer et al. (2018), published notably by the Banque de France.
IFO (2017) = Felbermayr et al. (2017a) where IFO = IFO institute (Germany)
IFO (2018) = Felbermayr et al. (2018b)
CPB (2016) = Rojas-Romagosa (2016) where CPB = Central Planning Bureau (the Netherlands)
KUL (2017) = Vandenbussche et al. (2017) where KUL = Katholiek Universiteit Leuven (Belgium)
Bank of Italy (2018) = Pisani and Vergara Caffarelli (2018)
NIESR (2016) = Ebell and Warren (2016) where NIESR = National Institute for Economic and Social Research (UK)
NIESR (2018) = Hantzsche et al. (2018b)
Most Brexit studies have examined a WTO scenario, which is closest to an (orderly) no deal from a long-
term perspective, relative to a baseline where the UK remains in the EU. For such a scenario:
· the impact of Brexit is always found to be negative in terms of GDP (or welfare) for both the UK
and the EU27 (or the euro area) considered as a whole;
· the GDP/welfare loss is always much higher for the UK than for the whole EU27. This is mainly
because the EU27 represents a much more significant export market and supplier for the UK
than the UK is for the EU27;
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· reflecting the huge uncertainty17 around the estimates, the impact of Brexit, especially on the
UK economy, varies substantially depending on the channels and the models considered.
Table 1 - Long-term impact on GDP/welfare of Brexit in a WTO scenario
 (percentage point of GDP/welfare deviation from EU-like scenario)
Institution Losses Channels Kind of methods
UK EU27
LSE (2017) -2.7 Trade, EU budget
Comparative static, trade models
LSE (2018) -3.3 Trade
IMF (2018b) -4.0 -0.5
CAE (2018) -2.7 -0.8
IFO (2017) -1.7 -0.3 Trade
IFO (2018) -3.2 -0.6
CPB (2016) -4.1 -0.8 Trade CGE macro model
KUL (2017) -4.5 -1.5 Trade, global value chains Comparative static, trade model withsector-level input-output linkages
Bank of Italy
(2018)
-2.0
-10.6
-0.3 (EA)
-0.5 (EA)
Trade
Trade, TFP
DSGE macro model
IMF (2018b) -1.5 Integration Various methods
NIESR (2016) -3.2 Trade, tariffs, FDI, EU budget
Macroeconomic model (NiGEM)
-7.8 Idem + labour productivity shock
NIESR (2018)
-5.5
Goods and services trade
volumes, FDI, net migration, EU
budget + limited labour
productivity shock
UK Gov
(2018b) -7.7
Trade, new trade deals,
deregulation CGE macro model (+ gravity)
-9.3 Idem + migration (zero netinflows of EEA workers)
-9.9 Trade, business investment-productivity Idem (with capital accumulation)
UK Treasury
(2016) -7.5
Trade, FDI,
uncertainty persistence Back-of-the-envelope calculationsfor trade based on estimates of
trade destruction and trade-
income elasticity
LSE (2018) -8.1 Trade
-8.7 Trade and migration
Sources: Dhingra et al. (2017), Ebell and Warren (2016), Felbermayr et al. (2017a and 2018b), Hantzsche et al. (2018b), IMF
(2018b), Levell et al. (2018), Pisani and Vergara Caffarelli (2018), Rojas-Romagosa (2016), UK Government (2018b), UK
Treasury (2016), Vandenbussche et al. (2017), Vicard (2018).
For the UK, the highest GDP losses induced by Brexit (over 5 percentage points and, in some cases,
even over 10 percentage points) are found in:
17  This uncertainty is also reflected in the original studies in the fact that the results are often presented in ranges.
For the sake of simplicity, we have kept to central estimates throughout this paper.
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- reduced-form approaches based on estimates of trade-income elasticity: notably the UK Treasury
(2016) and LSE (2018);
- models where a significant total factor productivity (TFP) shock18 has been added (Bank of Italy19,
2018);
- models where a significant labour productivity shock has been added (NIESR, 2016);
- macroeconomic models of international trade, such as the UK Government’s computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model20 (2018b) or NiGEM21 (NIESR, 2016 and 2018), where several channels
have been combined.
In its post-November-2018 deal report, the UK Government (2018b) did actually publish several results
depending on the channels considered:
· when only trade effects are considered, the combined GDP loss for the UK due to Brexit
amounts to 7.6 %: 1.4 percentage points of GDP for the extra tariffs and 6.5 percentage points
for non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in EU-UK trade, and then discounting for the gains from concluding
new FTAs with a large number of countries22 (-0.2 of a percentage point);
· adding migration (0.2 of a percentage point under the no-change-to-migration arrangements23)
and integrating small gains from further deregulation (-0.1 percentage point) leads to a
combined loss of 7.7 % of GDP;
· If there is a change in migration policy, in particular if migration flows are curbed to a zero net
inflow of EEA workers, then the UK’s GDP loss due to Brexit is further increased by
1.6 percentage point of GDP and is estimated at 9.3 % of GDP.
18 Such a shock has also been implemented by CPB (2016) with the same effect of increasing significantly the
GDP losses due to Brexit.
19 In this WP, the Bank of Italy uses a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. As their name
indicates, DSGE models are general equilibrium models (see next footnote). They are “dynamic” and
“stochastic” in the sense that they aim at replicating the models’ macro variables’ dynamics following unexpected
shocks.
20  As a general equilibrium model, it is composed by a system of equations (structural representations of agents’
behaviour, based on microeconomic theory) that has been calibrated to match the data set as tight as possible
and that can be solved for a ultimate equilibrium (“steady-state”) solution through satisfying necessary market
clearing conditions for all markets (goods, services, factors of production). As it models all markets together, it
takes full account of second-round and knock-on effects. A CGE model is often built around a large input-output
data structure and is augmented with trade matrices, representing the intensity of trade flows between countries
and sectors. When a CGE model includes time dynamics, the wording CGE macro model is used throughout
the paper.
21  NiGEM stands for the National Institute Global Econometric Model. Produced and developed by the NIESR, it
is a widely-used macroeconomic model, also in Brexit studies (e.g. Kierzenkowski et al. (2016) at the OECD).
22 The United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, China, India, Mercosur (Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait
and Bahrain).
23 In this case, the lower economic output in the UK due to the trade channel reduces the incentives for EEA
workers to emigrate to the UK.
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· Starting out from just the trade effects of Brexit (loss of 7.6 % of GDP), the UK Government has
also performed several sensitivity analyses, one of which consisting in allowing for capital
accumulation24. The activation of this channel leads to a further increase in the UK output loss
by 2.3 percentage points. So, the GDP loss from trade and investment channels comes to
9.9 %. If we add a policy aiming at ending net inflows of EEA migration, the GDP loss may well
exceed 10 % of GDP.
Results are also found to be rather sensitive to the market structure. To illustrate this point, the IMF
(2018c) has compiled results25 for three versions of its trade model corresponding to different degrees
of competition. It has been shown that the estimated UK GDP losses from higher barriers, when the UK
trades with the EU on WTO terms, ranges from 3.8 % in the version with perfect competition among
production firms to 4.2 % in the version of monopolistic competition like Krugman (1980) and to 6.4 %
in the version of monopolistic competition with firm-level heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003).
If we limit ourselves to models considering the effects of trade, then the maximum GDP loss for the UK
remains below 5 %, varying from 1.7 % in IFO (2017) to 4.5 % in KUL (2017). These studies in the upper
part of the table are the only ones that feature results for most of the individual EU countries and will be
discussed more into depth in the next section.
For the EU as a bloc, the maximum loss is limited to 1.5 % of GDP. This level is found in both the KUL
model where global value chains (GVC) are fully included and in the IMF’s (2018b) assessment based
on an integration index intended to capture various channels of economic integration26. Adding a TFP
shock on the UK has barely any impact on the euro area as shown by the Bank of Italy (2018).
5. How large is the expected impact of Brexit for a small country highly exposed to the UK like
Belgium?
In this section, we will examine the impact of a hard Brexit (WTO scenario) for Belgium, as an example
of a small economy open to trade with the UK. As mentioned in the previous section, the only studies
24 The rationale behind this channel is that changes in productivity resulting from the changes in trade affect returns
on capital, the levels of investment and capital in the economy and the capital to labour ratio.
25 These results from the November 2018 Article IV Report for the UK vary slightly from those presented in the
Table 1 that are based on the July 2018 Article IV Report for the euro area due notably to a revision in the NTB
increases by sectors considered as these trade shocks have been harmonised together with trade elasticities.
However, results of November 2018 are published only for the UK while those from July cover most of EU
countries.
26 The IMF (2018b) has estimated the long-term effect of a partial reversal of EU integration with the UK on the
EU27 GDP (and employment) following a three-step method. First, it has built a multi-dimensional index that
captures the depth and trend of integration between the UK and the rest of the EU, combining trade in domestic
value added, participation in supply chains, openness in services trade, cross-border banking positions and
migration. Second, it has determined the relationship between EU27 countries’ output and their integration with
the UK by regressing output on several control variables and the integration index. Third, it has calibrated the
change in the integration index from post-Brexit scenarios.
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reporting findings for a wide range of EU countries are those focusing on the Brexit trade channel and
that do not try to estimate dynamic gains from trade through productivity. All these studies rely on the
same two-step methodology to estimate trade losses from Brexit.
1. Tariffs and NTBs are gathered along with other key parameters, in particular trade elasticity
showing the extent trade to which volume flows decline when trade costs rise. While tariffs are
observed for all products and can be aggregated across goods categories27, NTBs need to be
estimated28 either bottom-up by calculating directly and summing up the various costs or top-
down by econometric estimates of past trade relationships (ideally by estimating gravity
equations/models or by taking figures from the literature). Typically, these gravity models aim
at isolating the total impact of trading on EU terms relative to other trade terms (WTO, etc.). In
practice, they estimate the increase in trade volumes due to EU integration separately from
other trade agreements such as being part of the EEA or another FTA or other EU integration
steps like the euro area or the Schengen area and from other characteristics that are usually
found to boost trade between countries. More trade is expected with a heavy populated and
richer country or area than with a sparsely populated one or poorer one and between countries
that are close to each other rather than between distant ones. Other characteristics than market
size (GDP, population) or geographical distance may comprise a shared language, past
historical links, etc. The estimated coefficient for trade volume changes can be transformed into
any estimate of declining NTBs.
2. Tariffs and NTB changes29 are injected into a trade model which can be the same gravity model
or a multi-country trade model, most often a CGE model. Except for the CPB (2016), CGE
models are used in comparative static, pointing up the effect of changing from one Brexit
scenario (Remain in the baseline) to another (WTO in this section).
As expected, all models predict GDP/welfare losses for Belgium in the WTO scenario (table 2) since
any gains from trade diversion do not fully offset direct trade losses with the UK and indirect trade losses
via third EU countries. GDP/welfare losses for Belgium are always (much) lower than those for the UK
and in most cases higher than those for the EU27 (average), since Belgian exposure to the UK is lower
than the UK’s exposure to the EU but is larger than the EU average exposure to the UK30.
27 They therefore differ very little from one study to another as all economists have assumed that UK-EU trade in
goods would be subject to the EU’s current MFN tariffs with countries in the rest of the world not having
preferential tariffs because of a FTA with the EU. Cappariello (2017) has calculated tariffs for all EU countries.
28  “Quantifying NTBs is a challenge because of their heterogeneous nature and because of the difficulty of
constructing comprehensive measures. Research on international trade has developed techniques to estimate
an ad-valorem tariff equivalent of NTBs. These can be interpreted as the tariff rate that would have an equally
restrictive effect as the NTBs in question” (Bank of England, 2018).
29 It is then assumed that the rise in trade costs due to Brexit is the same or a portion of the decline in trade costs
due to EU integration.
30  This point has already been made in NBB (2016) on the basis of the OECD’s trade in value added (Tiva) data
for the year 2011. It is confirmed on the basis of the Tiva data for 2015 released recently.
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The scale of GDP losses estimated for Belgium differs widely across the studies covered31. For the WTO
scenario, the range of expected GDP losses for Belgium varies from 0.5 % in IFO (2017) and 0.6 % in
LSE (2017 and 2018) to 2.1 % in CPB (2016) and 2.3 % in KUL (2017). These figures may be compared
with the share of the value added produced in Belgium that is generated by final demand of UK origin
(around 3 % in 201132). This could mean that, in the latter study, most of the Belgian value added
exported one way or another to the UK would disappear with Brexit, not just because of trade breaking
off as in the case of an embargo but simply due to some added barriers.
The KUL model takes global value chains and input-output linkages in production fully into account. In
this study, the main result may to some extent be due to:
- the method implying the inclusion of indirect effects of trade and the full use of sectoral data
and parameters (trade elasticity, NTB per sector, input-output linkages, etc.);
- the assumptions of no trade diversion (hence, Belgium cannot divert any loss in trade with the
UK by trading more with other countries);
- the assumption of a complete pass-through of trade costs to domestic prices.
The CPB study is the only study covered in table 2 to consider a time dimension and to allow for two
factors of production, including capital stock on top of labour. We have identified some factors driving
their Brexit GDP losses up, notably for Belgium:
- in their model, capital accumulation through investment plays an amplifying role;
- the CPB study has looked at the “effects of trade tariff changes on the shift of inputs, such as
labour and capital, caused by sector-specific production changes and has accounted for shifts
in production between sectors (including employment)”;
- the CGE macroeconomic model also features increasing returns to scale à la Krugman (1980);
- while not the highest, the NTBs (12.9 % on average for goods and for services), are not the
lowest either (see insert);
- the CPB study reports results for Belgium and Luxembourg together and not for Belgium alone.
The five other studies are similar in their modelling approach in the sense that the results are reported
as comparative static (also for the KUL). The model of reference is that of Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare
31  Felbermayr et al. (2018c) figures have not been included since I have discovered this study too late.
32  The data used in the Brexit impact studies covered in this paper are based on the 2011 input-output tables
(some being extrapolated up to 2014). According to recent Tiva data for 2015, the share of the value added
produced in Belgium that is generated by final demand of UK origin has increased to 3.8 % of GDP (Monitoring
Brexit, January 2019).
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(2014) for the LSE, IMF and CAE. The IFO studies refer to a similar model, that of Caliendo and Parro
(2015), but they consider only Ricardian comparative advantages as sources of static gains from trade33.
The use of a Ricardian model is one explanation for the rather low economic impact of Brexit found in
IFO (2017). Another factor is the inclusion of the EU budget as a transmission channel34 of Brexit, which
has also been the case in LSE studies. In a WTO scenario, the UK will no longer contribute to the EU
budget. This reduces the negative impact of Brexit on UK GDP/welfare by, respectively, 0.15 to 0.3 of a
percentage point in LSE (2017) and IFO (2018). The latter also reports the negative impact of this fiscal
transfer for EU countries, but it is marginal (0.06 of a percentage point on average). For the LSE, another
explanation for the low economic impact of Brexit is the small size of the NTB increase (see insert). The
moderate Brexit trade impact on GDP in the IFO simulations may stem from the fact that it has isolated
membership of the EU from other regional trade agreement and that they are the only studies to look at
the asymmetric effects of EU membership for the UK and the other EU27 countries and because their
estimate relies on a very short period (2000-2014)35.
In general, differences36 across studies may stem from the data, the size of the trade shocks applied (in
particular, NTB changes) or some specifications of the model (especially key parameters such as trade
elasticity).
Looking at the data, most studies investigating the impact of Brexit on EU countries have used the
publicly available World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The LSE and the IMF have used the 2013
edition37 with data until 2011, corresponding until recently to the latest official input-output tables
available in a harmonised way, while the IFO institute, the CAE and the KUL have used the 2016 edition
with data until 2014. Some have argued that the 2011 results were less stable in the sense that 2011
33  This implies trade in different products (wine versus cars, for example) and not trade in varieties of a same
product (different models of cars). The latter kind of trade involves love-of-variety effects.
34  Conversely, the LSE also includes the fact that, by leaving the EU, the UK will not benefit from further EU27
integration. This factor mainly affects the UK and has little negative impact on the EU countries.
35  Identification of the UK’s EU membership during 2000-2014 is more difficult as the UK had joined the EU in
1973 (absorbed by fixed effects) and trade with Eastern European countries (that joined the EU during in that
period) is less important for the UK whose main EU trade partners are Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Ireland and Belgium” (Felbermayr et al., 2018b).
36  Another difference that we have not explored as it mainly affects the UK (and not the EU27 economies) is the
extent to which the UK also loses access to the markets of the countries with which it currently trades under
FTAs that have been concluded with the EU. Trade with these other countries accounted for 12% of UK imports
and 13 % of exports in 2016 (Fullfact, 2018a). Tetlow and Stojanovic (2018) mention that both the LSE and the
CPB assume that the UK retains its access to these markets while this is not the case for IFO.
37 See Timmer et al. (2015) for a description.
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was an atypical year. The CPB used the GTAP9 database38, which is a more common choice in the
UK39.
Both databases cover all EU countries. GTAP can map supply chains more precisely with wider
coverage in terms of countries (140). This wider coverage has also justified preference for GTAP as it
favours estimation of trade creation, trade diversion and third-country effects (Aichele et al., 2016).
However, in the context of Brexit, most researchers prefer WIOD40 “because GTAP is less up to date
and burdened with higher measurement errors and because the absence of continuous annual data
complicates econometric estimates” (Felbermayr, 2017a).
NTBs are more difficult to assess. In general, bottom-up estimates are found to be lower than top-down
ones (UK Government, 2018a). In bottom-up approaches, some costs may be ignored or
underestimated (Tetlow and Stojanovic, 2018). In top-down approaches, the NTBs may be over-
estimated especially if tariffs are not treated separately in the gravity equations41.
- The lowest reported NTB increases for the WTO scenario are those – bottom-up – in the LSE
study (also used by the KUL). Assuming three-quarters of the reducible42 NTBs found by Berden
et al. (2009)43 in EU-US relations, they amount to 8.3 %44.
- The CPB also used results from econometric estimates of US-EU NTBs, such as those from
Egger et al. (2015) for goods and Jafari and Tarr (2015) for services, but these estimates are
obtained via a top-down approach. The NTBs average 12.9 % for both goods and services
sectors in a WTO scenario.
- IFO researchers have carried out their own econometric estimates on data referring to the 2000-
2014 period. They took the asymmetry in the UK’s trade relations with the EU27 into account.
An EU (and euro area) exporter would face 12.1 % NTBs when trading with the UK, while a UK
exporter would face 18.7 % NTBs when trading with EU counterparts (Kadow et al., 2018).
These NTBs vary across sectors.
38  See Narayanan et al. (2015) for more details on GTAP9.
39 For example, the UK Government (2018a, b) studies rely on GTAP9.
40 WIOD data have their own weaknesses too, especially for countries where financial services play a significant
role like Malta and Luxembourg.
41 This is the case of CAE that implies very high NTB increases (tariffs included) in the WTO scenario for the goods
sector alone.
42 Berden et al. (2009) have found a weighted average across all sectors of NTBs on trade flows from the United
States to the EU of 20.4 %. They have also considered that, on average, 54 % of these NTBs is the share of
costs that are potentially reducible thanks to a FTA (the TTIP).
43  In Berden et al. (2009) “the size of NTBs is estimated using a combination of literature reviews, business surveys
among about 5 500 firms, econometric analyses (gravity regressions) and consultations with regulators and
sector experts” (Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa, 2016).
44 It is this average effect found for goods and services sectors that is applied as a shock in the trade model
afterwards but evenly for all sectors.
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- The IMF (2018b)45 selected sectoral NTB increases among different sources: Berden et al.
(2009) for some sectors and the UK Government’s top-down gravity approach (2018a) for other
sectors. They have also assumed higher NTB increases in several cases, notably in the
transport equipment sector to reflect the supply chain linkage. Together with the use of the
increasing returns version of their model, this contributes to slightly higher Brexit losses in IMF
(2018b) than in the LSE studies.
Turning to parameters, a significant one in the Brexit impact studies is trade elasticity. With the
exception of the IMF (2018b), which kept the same value as the LSE for most46 sectors, the trade
elasticity values differ for each study. In most cases, trade elasticity is constant across all services
sectors but differs widely from one study to another. For goods, trade elasticity differs across sectors
within all studies except the CAE’s. In most other studies, trade elasticity for the goods sectors has been
found in the literature. IFO (2018b and c) has managed to estimate trade elasticity for goods using the
same data on which the model is calibrated.
Amending the values for trade elasticity (and even the relative values for the goods and services sectors)
may substantially change the magnitude of Brexit losses47.
45  In IMF (2018c), the staff used the NTBs and trade elasticities found in Febelmayr et al. (2018b).
46 The IMF (2018b) specifically left the trade elasticity for the transport equipment sector pointing upwards. This
also contributes to somewhat higher Brexit losses than in LSE studies.
47  See sensitivity analysis in Febelmayr et al. (2018c).
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6. How large are the expected losses for the EU countries in case of a WTO scenario ?
For most EU countries, GDP/welfare losses induced by a hard Brexit alongside a WTO scenario have
been published in the studies covered in the previous section. With a view to comparing the impact of
Brexit on the EU economy and to establishing rankings for the most badly affected countries, we have
computed the minimum48, maximum49 and median across the studies for which results were available50.
Figure 4 - WTO scenario losses may differ across the studies but the ranking of countries
is fairly the same
(percentage points of GDP/welfare deviation from an EU-like scenario, results from seven
studies)
Countries are ranked by decreasing median GDP/welfare losses.
In the CPB’s study, results are combined for BE and LU. The losses have been applied to BE and LU separately.
Sources: Dhingra et al. (2017), Felbermayr et al. (2017a and 2018b), IMF (2018b), Rojas-Romagosa (2016), Vandenbussche
et al. (2017a), Vicard (2018), own calculations.
48  As for Belgium and the UK, most of the minimum losses are found in IFO (2017) and, in some cases (Croatia,
Cyprus, Estonia, Greece and Romania), in CAE (2018) as both studies distinguish several steps in the EU
integration process. In four cases (Finland, France, Italy and Slovakia), lower losses are found in IMF (2018b).
49 As for Belgium and the UK, most of the maximum GDP/welfare losses are found from the KUL (2017) study,
reflecting the full sectoral approach with the focus on GVC. The only exceptions are Cyprus, Luxembourg and
Malta where the maximum losses are found in IFO (2018) and Greece where the maximum loss is found in CPB
(2016). For the first three countries, this may reflect high NTBs to financial services for trade with the UK.
50  The eight studies covered in the previous section have been examined apart from LSE (2018) since the results
of this research are very close to those found in LSE (2017).
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Several lessons can be drawn from this comparison:
· The substantial distance for most countries between the minimum and maximum reflects the
uncertainty around the results even for the static losses of the Brexit trade channel;
· The ranking51 of the losses is determined by the degree of openness with respect to the UK.
This openness may be in terms of geographical distance or more cultural and based on
historical connections. This degree of openness reflects the initial52 strength of trade ties, taking
input-output (involving third countries) into account. Based on the medians, the biggest
GDP/welfare losses are expected for Ireland53, Malta54 and the UK (more than 3 percentage
points). The three Benelux countries follow in descending order of Brexit-induced GDP losses,
Luxembourg showing median losses of more than twice the EU27 average. The Netherlands
faces median losses slightly above 1 percentage point, while Belgium’s GDP/welfare may
contract by close to 1 percentage point. Denmark, Cyprus and Sweden are also found to face
expected losses equal or above the EU27 average (0.6 %). Losses are limited to less than half
of the EU27 average in all the other countries including the four main euro area countries
(Germany55, France, Italy and Spain). Relative to smaller economies, the latter countries can
absorb a trade shock like Brexit more easily due to the larger size of their domestic markets and
their more diversified trade ties (Felbermayr et al., 2018c).
51  The ranking of the countries, especially the distinction between the most affected countries and the others, does
not vary much from one study to another. It is also robust to higher values for trade elasticity in both services
and goods sectors as illustrated by Febelmayr et al. (2018c).
52  With data from 2011 or 2014 according to the input-output database.
53  The losses appear to be higher in Ireland than in the UK in four out of seven studies, including the minimum
(IFO, 2017) and the maximum (KUL, 2017). All these studies use the WIOD (2016) database. The rationale
behind higher losses for Ireland than for the UK is that Ireland is a much smaller and more open economy than
the UK and it thus relies more on trade. Ireland is also less reliant on trade with the EU but more on trade with
the United States, its first export market and second import market. Macroeconomic estimates have also found
that both Ireland and the UK are expected to face supply shocks due to Brexit as inflation is found to be higher
and growth to be lower, while in most other EU countries, the Brexit shock acts as a demand shock lowering
both inflation and growth.
54  The wide variation for Malta (and Luxembourg) may reflect the difficulties in the treatment of highly services-
oriented economies and errors included in WIOD data.
55  Only KUL (2017) reports a Brexit-induced GDP loss higher in Germany and in France than in the EU27 as a
whole.
21
Figure 5 - Only certain countries are expected to endure severe Brexit losses in a WTO scenario
(percentage point of GDP/welfare deviation from an EU-like scenario, classification in terms of
median losses)
Sources: Dhingra et al. (2017), Felbermayr et al. (2017a and 2018b), IMF (2018b), Rojas-Romagosa (2016), Vandenbussche
et al. (2017a), Vicard (2018), own calculations.
7. To what extent can a trade agreement mitigate the expected Brexit losses ?
All studies reporting results for individual EU countries have considered at least one other scenario
where the EU and the UK concludes a trade agreement. In some cases, it is a FTA as for the IMF
(2018b) and IFO (2018) or a deferred FTA (CPB, 2016). In other cases, it even is plain membership of
the EEA, as in LSE (2017) and KUL (2017). In LSE (2018), it is a customs union with a view to proxying
an estimate of the backstop contained in the Protocol on Northern Ireland. In all these scenarios, tariffs
are cut to zero for all goods while NTB increases are set arbitrarily at a lower value than under the WTO
scenario.
Two studies have considered several alternative Brexit scenarios. The four scenarios in CAE (2018) are
a Norway model (EEA), a model like Switzerland, an average FTA and the WTO. IFO (2017) has
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presented no less than eight scenarios, four of which are particularly useful in an analysis of the possible
impact of Brexit :
1)  ‘WTO’: for trade between the EU and the UK, including MFN tariffs and NTB increases as
estimated from the gravity equations.
2) ‘ambitious FTA’: the UK still leaves the Single Market and EU Customs Union but concludes an
ambitious modern FTA with the EU featuring zero tariffs and, in terms of NTBs, full reversal of the
estimated trade-cost-reducing effects from the EU-South Korea FTA56.
3) ‘EEA-like’: compared to scenario 2, NTBs are reduced by an additional 50 %57 since the UK is
assumed not to leave the Single Market anymore in this case (but it still leaves the Customs Union).
4) ‘FTA and a customs union (CU)’: compared to scenario 2; it is assumed that trade between the
EU and the UK will not require proof of origin where the administrative cost is found to average 5 %.
NTBs for goods are therefore reduced by a further 5 percentage points.
56  See EC (2017) for an assessment of the impact of the FTA between the EU and South Korea. The EU-Korea
agreement that has been into force since 2011 is one of the EU’s most ambitious FTAs (Lakatos and Nilsson,
2017). It is the closest to the CETA for which no data are yet available as it has only recently been implemented
(on a temporary basis).
57  The distance between the trade-cost-reducing effects of an ambitious FTA (scenario 2) and full membership of
the EU is reduced by 50 %.
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Table 4 - Long-term impact of various Brexit scenarios
(percentage points of GDP/welfare deviation from an EU-like scenario)
Institution Scenario GDP / welfare losses for Tariffs NTBs
the UK the EU27 BE
LSE (2017) WTO -2.7 -0.3 -0.6 MFN 8.3 %
EEA -1.3 -0.1 -0.3 Zero 2.8 %
n.a.
n.a.
8.3 %LSE (2018) WTO -3.3 -0.6 MFN
Backstop -1.7 -0.3 Zero Goods: 2.8 %
Services: 7.3 %
IMF (2018b) WTO -4.0 -0.5 -0.9 MFN Varying across sectors
FTA -2.5 -0.2 -0.5 Zero Half of WTO
CAE (2018) WTO -2.7 -0.8 -0.7 Included Derived from the
FTA -2.2 -0.6 -0.6 in NTBs coefficients of the
Switzerland -1.8 -0.5 -0.5 gravity equation
EEA -0.8 -0.2 -0.2
IFO (2017) WTO -1.7 -0.3 -0.5 MFN Gravity EU/UK coefficient
FTA -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 Zero South Korea coefficient
FTA and a CU -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 Zero Idem minus 5 % NTB goods
EEA -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 Zero As FTA minus 50 %
IFO (2018) WTO -3.2 -0.6 -1.4 MFN Gravity EU/UK coefficient
FTA -1.8 -0.3 -0.5 Zero South Korea coefficient
CPB (2016) WTO -4.1 -0.8 -2.11 MFN Average : 12.9 %
FTA (2029) -3.4 -0.6 -1.51 Zero Average : 6.4 %
KUL (2017) WTO
EEA
-4.5
-1.2
-1.5
-0.4
-2.3
-0.6
MFN
Zero
8.3 %
2.8 %
Sources: Dhingra et al. (2017), Felbermayr et al. (2017a and 2018b), IMF (2018b), Levell et al. (2018), Rojas-Romagosa
(2016), Vandenbussche et al. (2017), Vicard (2018).
1 Belgium and Luxembourg.
LSE studies (2017 and 2018) also feature the loss of benefits from further EU27 integration.
The main conclusions from the studies focused on trade effects are as follows:
- There is no scenario of a soft Brexit that is expected to lead to GDP/welfare gains relative to Remain.
In other words, GDP losses are expected in all Brexit scenarios – even soft Brexit ones – for the UK,
the EU27 (as a whole) and Belgium58.
- With respect to a WTO scenario, all countries win if an agreement is reached favouring trade between
the UK and the EU, whatever form this trade agreement takes. If the UK benefits more from a trade
agreement than Belgium and the EU27 in absolute terms, in relative terms, the main beneficiary is
not always the same. Even after a trade agreement, the GDP losses induced by a softer Brexit remain
higher for the UK than for Belgium and for the EU27 as a bloc.
58 This does not prevent that some sectors may win in some Brexit scenarios or that some EU countries may win
under some soft Brexit scenarios.
24
- Remaining in the Single Market as with EEA membership is the best strategy for the UK to minimise
output/welfare losses under a hard Brexit (WTO scenario). In that case, the Brexit loss is always
found to be divided by two or more in the UK, in the EU27 (as a whole) and in Belgium. Indeed, trade
in goods is tariff-free and NTB increases tend to be halved or more.
- The welfare gain associated with a move from the WTO to a FTA is always (much) lower than that
from WTO to EEA. Depending on how the FTA is defined in terms of trade cost shock, the gain can
either cover more than half of the GDP loss stemming from a WTO scenario or not.
- A Switzerland scenario is found to lead to smaller Brexit losses than those under a FTA but higher
than those under an EEA membership.
- The proxy for the Irish backstop estimated by the LSE (2018) halves the Brexit GDP losses reported
for the WTO scenario for both the UK and Belgium59.
- The IFO (2017) study shows that creating a new customs union between the UK and the EU27 on
top of a new generation FTA (as with South Korea) may also mitigate the NTBs for goods (due to
rules-of-origin effects) and thus the Brexit losses in value added to an extent similar to the EEA
scenario.
In this IFO (2017) study, even moving from a WTO scenario to a South Korea/CETA-like FTA may lead
to a very significant reduction in the GDP losses for all countries. For most Member States60, this move
would cut the losses occurred in a WTO scenario by more than half. Adding a customs union or a full
Single Market yields further benefits. For most countries61, more losses are recovered under a Norway
scenario (EEA) than under an improved FTA cancelling out rules-of-origin costs. Even under a FTA or
an EEA scenario, the ranking of the most negatively impacted countries due to Brexit is very similar.
59 Relative to the WTO scenario, the other countries are reported to mitigate between one-quarter (small EU
countries) and two-thirds (Greece) of their income losses ten years after Brexit. Ireland is expected to contain
only around 39 % of its WTO income loss.
60  The exceptions are Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.
61  The exceptions are countries where services represent a high share of exports, in particular, the UK, Malta,
Luxembourg and Cyprus.
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Table 3 - GDP losses in various Brexit scenarios
(deviation from an EU-like scenario, in percentage points)
WTO (South Korealike) FTA
FTA and a
Customs
union
EEA
Ireland -2,03 -0,88 -0,77 -0,52
UK -1,73 -0,57 -0,36 -0,4
Malta -1,65 -0,71 -0,23 -0,46
Luxembourg -1,4 -0,46 0,02 -0,37
Cyprus -0,51 -0,23 -0,13 -0,15
Belgium -0,46 -0,2 -0,14 -0,13
Netherlands -0,44 -0,21 -0,15 -0,14
Slovakia -0,35 -0,23 -0,19 -0,15
DenmarK -0,31 -0,16 -0,12 -0,1
Poland -0,27 -0,14 -0,12 -0,08
EU27 -0,26 -0,11 -0,09 -0,07
Sweden -0,26 -0,12 -0,09 -0,08
Hungary -0,24 -0,09 -0,08 -0,06
Germany -0,23 -0,1 -0,09 -0,06
Czech Republic -0,23 -0,09 -0,09 -0,06
Estonia -0,23 -0,11 -0,1 -0,07
Latvia -0,22 -0,1 -0,08 -0,06
Lithuania -0,21 -0,11 -0,1 -0,06
Bulgaria -0,2 -0,11 -0,1 -0,08
France -0,19 -0,09 -0,07 -0,06
Finland -0,17 -0,07 -0,06 -0,05
Portugal -0,17 -0,08 -0,07 -0,05
Spain -0,15 -0,07 -0,06 -0,04
Italy -0,15 -0,07 -0,06 -0,04
Greece -0,13 -0,07 -0,05 -0,05
Romania -0,13 -0,07 -0,05 -0,04
Slovenia -0,13 -0,07 -0,05 -0,04
Austria -0,11 -0,05 -0,04 -0,03
Croatia -0,11 -0,06 -0,05 -0,04
Source: Felbermayr et al. (2017a).
Countries have been ranked by decreasing WTO GDP losses.
In late November 2018, two studies on the long-term impact of Brexit used macroeconomic models to
estimate the extent to which the November 2018 deal may temper the economic losses that the UK
would endure under a no-deal scenario: Hantzsche et al. (2018b) at the NIESR on the basis of NiGEM
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and UK Government (2018b and c) on the basis of a CGE macro model. In both cases62, multiple
channels of Brexit - though not necessarily the same from one study to another - have been tested. The
NIESR researchers considered two alternatives to an orderly no deal (WTO scenario):
· a transition period until 2020 followed by a FTA along the lines of the Political Declaration. Their
interpretation of the Declaration is that of a FTA largely related to goods trade while trade in
services is heavily restricted;
· the same transition period followed by implementation of the Irish backstop. The backstop is
seen as a comprehensive trading relationship for goods with the UK in a single customs territory
and alongside that an agreement in services trade with some major restrictions.
Both scenarios assume that migration flows will be curtailed relative to a Remain scenario, but
restrictions would only be half the size of those assumed under a WTO scenario. The difference between
the backstop and the FTA scenarios primarily relates to access to the EU market, in particular for
services. For trade in goods, the NIESR thinks that the frictions under the backstop are on balance
similar to those under bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland.
The UK Government has considered several scenarios. One of these is the so-called White Paper (or
“Chequers”) scenario, based on the UK Cabinet’s July 2018 proposal. To include evidence that the deal
reached with the EU in November 2018 is narrower in terms of trade than the Chequers proposal, the
UK Government uses a sensitivity analysis scenario with 50 % more NTBs than estimated for the White
Paper.
62  To facilitate the comparison, we have opted for a sensitivity analysis scenario along the lines of NIESR where
the UK may conclude FTAs with third countries as UK Government simulations do. It is quite an optimistic
assumption as in both studies the UK is also assumed to keep the FTAs concluded between the EU and third
countries that it has enjoyed from being part of the EU.
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Figure 6 –The November 2018 deal should mitigate the Brexit losses expected for the UK in a no-deal
scenario
(percentage points of GDP deviation from an EU-like scenario)
Sources: Hantzsche et al. (2018b), UK Government (2018b).
NIESR: simulation until 2030.
According to the UK Government (2018b), the White Paper scenario would compensate nearly three-
quarters of the Brexit GDP losses that would be incurred under a(n orderly) no-deal scenario (WTO).
Even with the sensitivity scenario, concluding a trade agreement would mitigate nearly 60 % of the
economic costs of a WTO Brexit63. As the net migration assumption is the same in the three reported
scenarios, all the benefits from reaching a deal come from trade.
According to the NIESR, a backstop would mitigate 47 % of Brexit losses under an orderly no-deal
scenario, while a FTA would cover only 37 % of this loss. The lower mitigation effect of the deal in the
NIESR study may be explained by several factors:
· the benefits of the deal stemming from trade are smaller (than in the UK Government study);
· the NIESR assumes that there remains a productivity decline in both deals’ scenarios
(productivity is not considered as such by the UK Government64);
63  By comparison, an FTA would only compensate 29 % of the GDP loss under a WTO scenario, while an EEA
scenario - allowing for free movement of people and thereby no possibility of restricting migration of EEA workers
- would cut 85 % of the GDP loss incurred in a WTO scenario.
64  The UK Government has modelled a sensitivity analysis extending the model for business investment (see
above).
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· the NIESR assumes that the fall in FDI is only slightly reduced in both deals scenarios;
· in the backstop scenario, the UK has no independent trade policy and is thus not allowed to
conclude FTAs with third countries.
8. Conclusion
At the end of this survey of official and academic studies on the long-term economic impact of Brexit on
the UK and EU economies, several conclusions can be drawn.
Under all scenarios, Brexit is a lose-lose situation for both the UK and the EU economies, meaning that
GDP or welfare will increase by less under Brexit scenarios than if the UK remains in the EU. The UK is
found to be much more affected by Brexit than the EU27 since the UK represents a relatively small
share of EU27 trade, while the EU27 still accounts for close to a half of UK imports and exports.
Brexit losses vary widely from one study to another, and especially for the UK, reflecting great
uncertainty. For a given Brexit scenario – the most estimated one in the empirical literature being an
orderly no deal whereby future trade between the EU and the UK relies on World Trade Organisation
(WTO) terms (with Most Favoured Nation tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers) – the magnitude of the
results depends on the model specifications and on the channels considered. For the UK, adding other
channels than trade (FDI, migration, etc.) tends to increase the negative long-term impact on economic
activity. Higher GDP losses are also found in reduced-form approaches based on econometric estimates
of trade-income elasticity or when a productivity shock is added. Under extreme assumptions, the losses
may well exceed 10 % of GDP. If just the trade channel is considered, the losses are in general found
to remain below 5 % of GDP.
The range of results for the EU27 as a whole (and for most of the individual EU countries) is more limited
than that for the UK. Small open economies closely related to the UK are more hit than others due to
geographical proximity as is the case for Ireland, because of specialisation of its economy in financial
services (Luxembourg) or because they are Commonwealth countries (Cyprus and Malta). When only
the trade channel of Brexit is estimated, GDP (or welfare) losses amount to around 1 percentage point
of GDP in the Netherlands and in Belgium. In the four main euro area countries, they are lower than the
EU27 average (0.6 of a percentage point of GDP) due to less openness to trade with the UK and to their
larger home market. Significantly higher GDP losses are reported in global value chain approaches than
in purely trade models. Higher GDP losses are also associated with higher estimated values for the
shock variables (in particular, non-tariff trade barriers). The results are sensitive to the values set for
parameters, especially trade elasticities which indicate to what extent trade volumes decline with higher
tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
In the long-term studies surveyed, worst-case scenarios such as a disorderly Brexit are not considered.
The financial channels are also not fully reflected.
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Under all scenarios, the economic losses due to Brexit are estimated ceteris paribus and in most cases
at unchanged policies. However, one of the main aims of Brexit for the UK is to take back control of its
borders and policies. The UK could thus mitigate the economic losses by activating its monetary, fiscal,
trade and/or regulatory policies. The UK would be more able to do so in hard Brexit scenarios (such as
the WTO) where it will regain more autonomy than in soft Brexit scenarios since a closer relationship
with the EU would impose less independent policies. Other considerations than economic ones have
also played a significant role in negotiating the Withdrawal Agreement reached in November 2018, in
particular, the need to prevent a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
Reaching a trade agreement for the future relationship between the UK and the EU could limit GDP
losses both for the UK and the EU Member States compared to a no-deal scenario. If the relationship
goes no further than a Free Trade Agreement like that between the EU and Canada, the losses are in
general expected to be less than halved. If the UK remains in the Single Market or the Customs Union,
the GDP losses induced by a WTO scenario could be even more contained and most often more than
halved for both the UK and the EU countries. First estimates of the deal reached at the November 2018
EU summit tend to show that a significant share of the economic loss under a WTO scenario may
disappear for the UK both in the backstop provided by the Protocol on Northern Ireland and in the free
trade area for goods and the FTA for services intended in the Political Declaration agreed in November.
After 46 years of EU membership, the UK economy is deeply integrated into the EU Single Market and
Customs Union and European value chains. Leaving the EU may allow the UK to recover some
autonomy in the design of its policies, but this will be at an economic cost. The more autonomy it
retrieves the more damaging it will be for the UK economy. An extreme case would be a no-deal
scenario. If not managed properly, huge costs may be felt immediately after leaving, possible as early
as 30 March 2019. On the contrary, leaving the EU with a deal would avoid these cliff-edge-related costs
and already substantially reduce uncertainty, even knowing that the future relationship between the EU
and the UK still has to be defined.
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